i ? - if  A ur 

OF  THE 

UNIVERSITY  of  ILi 

Reprinted  from  the  Educational  Review,  New  York,  June,  1895 


VI 


l 

1". 


HERBART’S  DOCTRINE  OF  INTEREST 

The  two  words  apperception  and  interest  suggest  for  us  the 
two  most  important  ideas  of  Herbart’s  pedagogy.  Appercep- 
tion implies  the  mind’s  reaction  against  the  impressions  of  the 
senses — it  recognizes  and  explains  to  itself  what  it  sees,  hears, 
;astes,  touches,  or  smells.  With  mere  perception  we  see  and 
tear,  but  we  do  not  make  out  for  ourselves  what  it  is  that  we 
>ee  and  hear.  When  we  connect  the  object  seen  or  heard 
with  the  totality  of  experience  and  explain  it,  we  are  said  by 
[Herbart  to  apperceive  it.  Mere  perception  without  appercep- 
tion is  stupid  work.  It  sees,  but  it  does  not  “make  out”  the 
[object.  For  every  object  is  as  it  were  a ganglion  in  an  infinite 
network  of  causal  relations — all  the  influences  of  the  universe 
iflow  hither  to  it  and  make  themselves  manifest  in  it  to  him 
[who  has  the  inward  eye  to  discover  them.  The  work  of  dis- 
covery is  apperception.  The  causes  that  have  made  this 
.object  what  it  is,  the  future  effects  of  its  being  and  acting,  the 
(significance  of  the  whole,  these  are  not  to  be  perceived,  but  to 
be  apperceived. 

The  idea  of  apperception  is  a rallying-point  for  reform  in 
lethods  of  teaching.  The  teacher  that  allows  his  pupils  to 
>top  in  words  without  a sense  of  their  meaning,  or  to  be  con- 
:ented  with  the  inspection  of  mere  things  without  a study  of 
:heir  relations,  needs  to  be  told  that  not  perception  but  apper- 
:eption  is  the  result  to  be  sought  by  teaching.  The  method 
:hat  is  content  with  mere  things  or  mere  words  must  give 
dace  to  a method  that  connects  words  with  the  stored-up 
human  learning  associated  with  them,  and  that  traces  up  the 
links  of  the  causal  series,  which  extends  outward  in  every 
iirection  from  each  thing. 

Apperception,  however,  is  usually  taken  by  Herbart’s  dis- 


71 


72  Educational  Review  f [June 

ciples  in  a more  restricted  meaning,  to  inside  the  process  of 
mental  reaction  in  the  presence  of  an  obj(^.  The  mind  con- 
nects the  newly-perceived  object  with  its  memories  of  the  same 
or  similar  objects  and  with  the  reflections  that  have  clustered 
about  it  as  an  individual  or  a class.  It  is  the  process  of  identi- 
fication or  classification ; it  is  the  recognition  of  the  new  as  a 
repetition  of,  or  a variation  from,  the  old. 

This  subjective  or  inner  reaction  of  the  mind  is,  in  fact,  a 
part  of  the  process  described  above  as  the  tracing-out  of  the 
causal  network  that  envelops  a thing  and  makes  it  to  be  what 
it  is.  It  is  necessary  to  the  proper  understanding  of  the 
significance  of  apperception  to  bear  this  in  mind.  It  is  the 
directing  of  the  mind  upon  the  causal  nexus.  It  is  always  a 
glimpse,  at  least,  of  the  genesis  of  the  object  (its  origination 
out  of  other  objects)  and  of  its  growth  into,  or  production  of, 
other  objects.  The  example  given  by  Noire  of  a causal  series 
of  this  kind  in  the  apperception  of  a piece  of  bread,  shows  i 
BREAD  in  the  middle,  a long  series  of  presuppositions  before 
it,  and  a long  train  of  consequences  following  it : grain,  rye, 
planting,  reaping,  threshing,  barn,  mill,  grinding,  meal,  dough, 
yeast,  hops,  lard,  kneading,  baking,  BREAD,  food,  eating, 
digesting,  nourishment,  animal  heat,  organic  tissue,  new 
strength  for  labor,  et  cetera.  And  one  could  pause  on,  each 
one  of  these  steps  in  the  causal  process  and  move  off  laterally 
on  a series  of  its  own.  This  gives  us  an  idea  of  the  business 
of  man,  in  comprehending  the  world  in  which  he  lives. 
Apperception  is  this  act  of  widening  our  knowledge  of  the 
immediate  being  of  objects  by  adding  to  it  the  mediations  or 
links  of  dependence  that  connect  it  with  the  totality. 

In  fact  the  full  force  of  the  idea  of  apperception  cannot 
be  seen  and  felt  until  the  teacher  outgrows  the  first  stage  of 
knowing  and  sets  it  aside  for  a second  and  higher  view  which 
sees  the  relativity  of  all  things.  Each  thing  is  relative  in  its  * 
very  essence,  being  derived  from  something  else'  different  | 
from  what  it  is  now,  and  having  a destiny  beyond  its  present  in 
which  it  will  have  still  different  functions. 

All  acquired  knowledge  is  “apperception-stuff”  or  material  , 


i 


[1895  Her  barfs  doctrine  of  interest 


73 


that  we  can  use  for  the  explanation  of  new  objects  presented 
to  us  by  our  senses. 

It  is  evident  that  the  first  maxim  of  pedagogy  would  direct 
the  teacher  to  take  pains  to  build  up  in  his  pupil  a mass  of 
apperception  material — a “concept-mass”  of  associated  ideas 
which  will  explain  to  the  pupil  his  world  and  prepare  him  to 
meet  the  demands  on  him  for  action.  He  must  grow  in  two 
directions — that  of  the  intellect,  and  that  of  the  will.  Herbart 
meets  this  with  his  doctrine  of  interest — education  must 
appeal  to  the  pupil’s  interest. 

But  Herbart  and  his  disciples  do  not  set  up  their  doctrine  of 
interest  solely  because  the  doctrine  of  apperception  would 
demand  it.  They  have  a special  reason  for  it  in  the  fact  that 
they  have  no  place  in  their  psychology  for  the  will  as  the  free 
self-determination  of  the  soul.  Herbart’s  system  makes  the 
soul  to  be  devoid  of  self-activity  and  of  all  multiplicity  of 
attributes. 

It  is  necessary  to  make  clear  this  important  point  in 
Herbart’s  system. 

Greek  thought  before  Plato  and  Aristotle  sought  in  various 
ways  to  solve  the  contradictions  of  experience,  wherein  we  see 
one  as  many  and  many  as  one.  The  earlier  systems  were  all 
failures.  Only  when  the  idea  of  self-activity  was  reached  by 
Plato,  and  demonstrated  by  Aristotle,  did  philosophy  attain  a 
firm  foundation  from  which  it  has  never  been  moved  in  the 
two  thousand  years  that  have  followed. 

After  the  time  of  William  of  Occam  it  seemed  indeed  for  a 
time  as  if  the  basis  of  ontology  had  been  proved  untrust- 
worthy : “All  universal  ideas  must  be  figments  of  the  intel- 
lect.” This  direction  of  thought,  however,  culminated  with 
the  Inquiry  of  Hume:  “'Even  the  Ego  is  only  an  arbitrary 
synthesis  of  feelings  and  mental  images.  Causality  is  only 
invariable  succession.”  But  Kant  just  at  that  time  opened 
a new  road  to  the  ontology  of  Plato  and  Aristotle  by  in- 
vestigating the  origin  of  the  ideas  of  time,  space,  quantity, 
quality,  and  causality.  His  followers,  Fichte,  Schelling.  and 
Hegel  succeeded  finally  in  demonstrating  through  psychol- 


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ogy  the  spiritual  results  reached  by  Plato  and  Aristotle 
through  ontology.  Self-activity  and  not  simple  pure  being  is 
the  Absolute. 

The  philosopher  Herbart,  although  his  youth  was  passed  in 
. the  days  of  these  highest  triumphs  of  the  human  intellect,  did 
^ not  enter  in  and  partake.  For  his  philosophy  was  reactionary. 
He  failed  to  grasp  the  idea  of  self-activity  as  the  principle  of 
philosophy,  and  as  a consequence  could  not  accept  either  the 
new  solution  of  Kant  and  Fichte,  or  the  old  one  of  Aristotle 
and  Thomas  Aquinas.  Although  he  borrowed  his  idea  of 
apperception  in  part  from  Leibniz,  he  was  not  able  to  see  the 
insight  on  which  Leibniz  had  based  his  Monadology,  namely 
the  idea  of  Entelechy  or  self-active  being. 

His  mind  rejected  the  only  two  positive  solutions  that  the 
human  race  has  reached,  the  Greek  and  the  German.  Chris- 
tian theology  has  distinctly  adopted  the  Aristotelian  proof  of 
the  Personality  of  God.1  The  Kantian  school  has  erected  a 
demonstration  equally  explicit  and  satisfactory  on  a new  basis, 
that  of  rational  psychology. 

In  the  face  of  these  facts  Herbart  turns  back  to  the  pre- 
Socratic  points  of  view  of  the  Eleatics  and  Atomists,  and 
adopts  with  commendation  the  metaphysics  of  Parmenides 
and  Democritus! 

In  his  Introduction  to  Philosophy  of  18132  Herbart  shows 
the  foundations  of  his  system.  The  problems  of  inherence, 
change,  continuity,  and  personal  identity  are  to  be  settled  by 
metaphysics.  That  is  to  say,  we  are  to  explain  how  a thing 
can  be  one  and  yet  have  many  properties;  how  reality  can 
change,  or  be  one  thing  at  one  time  and  another  thing  at 
another  time;  how  space  and  time  can  be  divisible  and  yet 
continuous;  and,  finally,  how  we  can  have  the  consciousness  of 
identity  under  all  our  various  moods  and  epochs  of  growth. 

Victor  Cousin  has  told  us  that  a philosopher  in  explaining  a 
fact  should  not  destroy  the  fact  that  he  attempts  to  explain. 

1 See  Aquinas,  Contra  Gentiles,  Cap.  XIII  ; and  Sunima  Theologica,  Qu.  II, 
Art.  3. 

2 Compare  also  his  short  Encyclopedia  of  Philosophy  of  1831,  § 226,  Anmerkung. 


1895]  Her  barf s doctrine  of  interest  75 

In  other  words  the  explanation  should  end  by  showing  how 
the  fact  is  again  re-established  by  the  principle  of  explanation. 
But  Herbart  does  not  re-establish  multiplicity  in  things,  the 
reality  of  change,  nor  the  continuity  of  space  and  time.  He 
destroys  them  all;  proves  them  to  be  illusions.  Far  worse 
than  this,  he  proves  the  self  to  be  a composite,  and  conscious- 
ness to  be  delusion:  “The  ego  is  a result  of  mental  pictures 
( Vorstellungen ) which  unite  and  interpenetrate  one  another 
in  a single  substance.”  This  “single  substance”  is  the  soul, 
which  Herbart  counts  among  the  simple  substances  which 
have  each  only  one  quality  and  no  self-activity.  All  finite 
things  in  time  and  space  arise  from  the  collisions  of  these 
“reals.”  Our  intellects  and  our  wills  are  not  substances,  but 
arise  only  from  the  mentioned  collisions. 

Thus  Herbart  adopts  substantially  the  doctrine  of  Hume  as 
regards  our  personal  identity.  What  we  call  our  individuality 
is  only  a result  of  the  reaction  of  the  ultimate  atoms  against 
one  another. 

Herbart  therefore  cannot  admit  will  as  belonging  to  the  soul 
as  an  ultimate  real.  In  fact  he  makes  will  to  be  a result  of 
the  third  order  of  removal  from  the  absolute  real.  First  there 
are  the  real  souls — inactive  and  devoid  of  all  qualities  except 
one — having  neither  intellect  nor  will  nor  love.  Next  Herbart 
supposes  collision  to  take  place  and  the  souls  to  react  against 
the  attacks  made  on  them.  This  reaction  or  self-preservation 
( Selbsterhaltung ) produces  mental  images  or  representations. 
If  we  consider  these,  in  their  totality,  to  form  the  intellect,  we 
shall  explain,  with  Herbart,  the  feelings  by  assuming  that  the 
partial  suppression  of  one  representation  by  others  gives  rise 
to  feeling.  But  the  successful  struggle  of  a representation 
against  others  that  tend  to  suppress  it,  is  desire.  “Desire 
becomes  will  when  it  is  accompanied  with  the  supposition  that 
the  object  of  its  wishes  is  attainable.”  The  intellect  is  the  first 
remove  from  the  real  substance;  the  feeling  is  the  second  ; the 
will  is  the  third.  In  his  General  Pedagogics , published  in  1806 
(Third  Book,  Chapter  4),  he  sums  up  a discussion  of  action 
{Handeln)  by  saying,  “Therefore  the  deed  creates  the  will  out 


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[June 


of  desire.”3  we  should  say  that  the  will  creates  the  deed,  but 
Herbart  says  that  the  deed  creates  the  will. 

It  is  interesting  to  note  that  Herbart  must  have  been 
impelled  to  adopt  his  doctrine  of  real  substances  by  reading 
the  second  chapter  of  Hegel’s  Phenomenology  of  Mind , pub- 
lished in  1807.  That  chapter  treats  of  “Thing  and  deception,” 
that  is  to  say  of  the  self-deception  of  the  second  stage  of 
thought  which  tries  to  explain  the  contradiction  of  unity  and 
multiplicity  (thing  and  properties)  by  various  suppositions; 
the  first  of  these  hypotheses  being  that  the  oneness  is  objec- 
tive and  the  multiplicity  subjective,  or  due  to  different  senses 
(acid  to  the  tongue,  white  to  the  eye,  cubical  to  the  touch,  etc.). 
Finding  this  to  be  untenable,  next  it  supposes  the  thing  to 
be  composed  of  different  substances  or  materials,  and  not  a 
unity  except  to  the  imagination  of  the  beholder.  Thirdly, 
another  hypothesis  is  adopted,  namely,  that  the  things  are 
each  simple  and  have  one  quality  and  the  multiplicity  of 
properties  arises  through  the  relation  of  each  thing  to  the 
others.  Here  we  find  Herbart’s  theory.  The  being  for  itself 
is  simple  and  one — the  being  for  others  is  multiple.  Hegel 
shows  however  that  this  involves  a new  contradiction;  for  the 
simple  quality  itself  is  not  determinate  except  in  relation  to 
others.  Hence  its  being  in  itself  is  its  being  for  others.  This 
result  Hegel  recognizes  to  be  the  definition  of  force , and  the 
mind  has  given  up  the  explanation  of  the  problem  of  inher- 
ence by  the  idea  of  thing  and  properties  and  adopted  the  idea 
of  force  as  the  explaining  principle.  Force  exists  essentially 
in  its  manifestation.  Force  acts  or  manifests  itself  if  it  exists. 
Here  is  a better  explanation  of  the  one  and  the  many  of 
experience.  But  Hegel  goes  on  and  proves  that  force  presup- 
poses self-activity  as  behind  it — neither  things  nor  forces  could 
be  were  there  not  will  beneath  them  in  the  universe.  (See 
the  third  chapter  of  the  Phenomenology  for  the  discussion  of 
force  and  the  demonstration  of  self-activity.) 

However  this  may  be,  Herbart  stops  at  the  doctrine  of 
reals  as  beings  in  themselves,  and  makes  the  worlds  of  nature 

3 Die  That  also  erzeugt  den  Willen  aus  der  Begierde. 


1895]  Her  bar  t' s doctrine  of  interest  77 

and  of  man  to  be  the  product  of  the  mechanical  action  and 
reaction  of  these  reals  upon  one  another. 

It  is  necessary  to  understand  Herbart’s  views  as  to  absolute 
reality  in  order  to  make  clear  his  pedagogy.  Even  his  doctrine 
of  apperception  with  all  its  suggestiveness  to  the  teacher, — who 
is  to  give  attention  rather  to  what  the  pupil  understands  than 
to  what  he  merely  sees  and  memorizes — even  this  doctrine  is 
seized  mechanically  by  Herbart  as  the  reaction  of  a series  of 
representations  in  the  mind  against  the  new  idea  entering 
through  the  senses.  But  the  main  business  of  Herbart,  now 
that  he  had  expressly  excluded  self-activity  from  the  real  sub- 
stances, was  to  explain  moral  action  or  ethics.  At  the  very 
beginning  most  people  would  see  that  this  is  entirely  hopeless. 
If  self-activity  does  not  belong  to  the  soul  but  only  to  .some  of 
its  phenomena  or  accidental  states  (Zustande),  morality  cannot 
appertain  to  it.  Quite  different  is  Hegel’s  conclusion  in  the 
Phenomenology  of  Mind.  For  he  finds  that  the  insight  of 
the  Old  Testament  that  God  is  a free  person  and  essentially 
righteous  and  gracious  is  the  arrival  of  man  at  absolute  know- 
ing. For  so  soon  as  one  discovers  that  absolute  being  must 
be  self-active  or  personal,  and  that  to  be  absolute  person  it 
must  be  just  and  gracious,  he  has  arrived  at  the  highest 
possible  insight — a knowing  which  must  at  the  same  time  be 
true  objectively. 

Orientalism  parts  company  with  European  thinking  on  this 
point.  For  all  Oriental  thought,  except  that  of  the  Old  Testa- 
ment, makes  the  absolute  to  be  something  above  (in  fact 
below)  personality,  and  above  (below)  righteousness  and  good- 
ness, and  all  this  because  it  makes  pure,  or  empty,  being, 
rather  than  self-activity,  the  characteristic  of  the  divine. 

Herbart  could  not  but  acknowledge  the  importance  of 
ethical  conduct  in  the  world.  Kant  had  filled  the  air  with 
utterances  on  the  sublimity  of  the  free  will  and  the  dignity  of 
virtue.  Herbart  repudiated  Kant’s  "transcendental  freedom,” 
and  for  him  there  remained  only  the  appearance  or  illusion  of 
freedom.4  For  as  self-activity  does  not  appertain  to  the  soul 
4 See  Text-book  in  Psychology , § 118. 


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[June 


as  real  substance,  of  course  the  will  cannot  be  self-determina- 
tion, but  only  the  false  semblance  of  it. 

And  yet  the  ethical  code  must  be  followed.  There  remains 
but  one  way  of  securing  ethical  conduct,  and  that  is  by  caus- 
ing the  soul  to  receive  only  ethical  representations  or  to  react 
on  the  new  representations  in  an  ethical  manner.  Hence  the 
doctrine  of  interest.  Herbart  will  have  the  child’s  interest 
aroused  in  ethical  views  of  the  world,  notwithstanding 
that,  according  to  his  philosophy,  all  real  being  is  above 
the  ethical — for  the  ethical  only  appertains  to  self-active 
beings. 

If  we  are  in  our  consciousness  and  feelings  only  the  battle- 
ground between  new  inflowing  ideas  and  ideas  already 
acquired,  we  are  helpless  in  our  morals  until  we  have  been 
made  to  acquire  a stock  of  moral  ideas.  Then  the  moral 
ideas  already  filling  our  mind  will  meet  the  new  ideas  coming 
in  from  without  and  suppress  whatever  is  antagonistic,  or 
immoral,  in  them. 

Interest,  according  to  Herbart,  has  two  sides,  the  interest  of 
knowledge  or  cognition  and  the  interest  of  sympathy  or  social 
co-operation  ( Theilnalnne ).  Each  of  these  has  three  sub- 
divisions. The  empirical,  speculative,  and  aesthetic  relate  to 
knowledge;  the  sympathetic,  social,  and  religious  relate  to  co- 
operation. Under  the  empirical,  he  places  natural  sciences, 
languages,  and  sciences  relating  to  man  ; under  the  speculative 
come  mathematics,  logic,  metaphysics,  physics,  etc.  Under 
aesthetics  he  includes  the  fine  arts  and  poetry. 

Here  is  a noteworthy  attempt  at  co-ordination  of  studies. 
Herbart  sees  the  importance  of  representing,  in  the  course 
of  study,  all  the  essential  provinces  of  human  learning  and 
of  human  conduct.  Moreover,  he  distinguishes  branches  of 
instruction  into  the  two  grand  divisions,  those  of  history — 
including  history  and  language, — and  those  of  nature — includ- 
ing also  mathematics.5  This  is  a deep  glance  into  the  neces- 
sity of  correlating  the  child  with  the  world  in  which  he  lives. 

Notwithstanding  his  denial  of  self-activity  to  real  substances 
6 See  his  Outlines  of  Pedagogy  in  Lectures , 1835-41,  §§  37-49. 


1895]  Her  bar  t' s doctrine  of  interest  79 

he  often  speaks  of  it  as  important  to  the  pupil:  “Interest  is 
self-activity,”  “The  pupil  needs  a many-sided  self-activity.” 
Freedom,  too,  is  often  spoken  of  as  the  one  desirable  thing. 
But  he  means  freedom  and  self-activity  only  as  phenomenal 
and  not  as  essential  attributes  of  the  soul  as  real  substance. 
So,  too,  the  immortality  of  the  soul  is  affirmed,  and  faith  in 
God  is  declared  essential.  But  the  immortality  of  a soul 
without  consciousness  or  will  is  the  immortality  of  a nothing. 
God,  too,  does  not  create  the  “reals,”  but  only  their  phe- 
nomenal disturbances.6 

This  doctrine  of  Interest  has  led  the  disciples  of  Herbart  to 
various  attempts  to  construct  a course  of  study  for  elementary 
and  secondary  schools.  Herbart  himself  laid  much  stress  on 
Homer’s  Odyssey,  Plato’s  Republic,  Vergil’s  ZEneid,  and 
similar  works.  Ziller  and  Rein  have  contended  for  what  they 
call  “concentration  of  studies,”  arranging  the  subordinate 

studies  about  a central  core  of  literature,  Grimm’s  Fairy 

# 

Stories,  Robinson  Crusoe,  and  the  like — a procedure  violently 
condemned  by  Stoy  as  excrescences  on  the  Herbartian  system. 

It  must  be  admitted  that  no  scheme  of  concentration  yet 
presented  escapes  wholly  from  the  severe  strictures  of  Stoy.7 
But  they  have  been  useful  as  compelling  attention  to  the 
deep  underlying  question  of  educational  values  that  so  seri- 
ously occupied  the  attention  of  Herbart.  The  attempted  sub- 
ordination of  history,  geography,  and  arithmetic  to  literature 
leads  immediately  to  the  violation  of  the  first  of  Herbart’s 
well  known  “formal  steps  of  instruction,”  namely,  isolation 
and  clearness.  He  demands  that  the  pupil  shall  absorb  him- 
self in  his  subject,  concentrating  all  his  attention  upon  it — 
this  is  called  Vertiefung.  Then  he  shall  correct  his  one-sided 
tendency  by  Besinnung,  or  the  recoil  from  this  specialization 
toward  the  opposite  direction  or  that  of  general  human  inter- 
ests, thereby  recovering  his  sanity.  The  subordination  of 
arithmetic  and  history  to  literature  produces  a neglect  of 

6 See  Falckenberg’s  excellent  discussion  of  Herbart  in  his  History  of  Modern- 
Philosophy,  pp,  516-536. 

7 See  De  Garmo’s  Herbart  and  Herbartians,  p.  158. 


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Educational  Review 


what  is  peculiar  to  those  branches — and  hence  they  suffer  in 
clearness.  The  result  has  been  well  described  by  Mr.  Marble 
as  “conglomeration”  instead  of  concentration.  I have  never 
seen  a course  of  study  on  the  concentration  plan  that  did  not 
in  some  way  show  a serious  want  of  balance : the  neglect  of 
the  principle  of  variety  for  the  sake  of  sanity  (Herbart’s 
Besinnung)  has  been  noticeable. 

But  the  ethical  reason  for  these  attempts  at  seizing  the 
pupil’s  interest  must  never.be  lost  sight  of.  They  are  attempts 
at  developing  a will  as  a derived  result  out  of  feelings  and 
intellect.  As  such  they  are  liable  to  exaggerations  and 
extremes  as  remarked  by  Stoy.  A sound  psychology  holds 
that  the  will  is  a primitive  activity  of  the  mind  like  the  intel- 
lect and  the  feelings,  and  that  it  is  to  be  respected  and 
appealed  to  as  such.  It  is  always  to  be  treated  as  something 
transcendental;  namely,  as  always  containing  in  itself  the 
power  of  rejecting  any  and  all  interests  in  the  world.  The 
great  Master,  when  tempted  by  the  Evil  One  who  offered  Him 
the  world  and  all  its  interests,  replied  in  effect:  ‘‘Take  them 
and  yourself  away.” 

W.  T.  Harris 

Bureau  of  Education, 

Washington,  D.  C. 

Other  contributions  by  Dr.  Harris  to  the  Educational  Review  have  been  : 

Fruitful  lines  of  investigation  in  psychology  (January,  1891):  Compayre’s  Ele- 
ments of  psychology  (January,  1891);  City  school  supervision  (February,  1892); 
Herbart  and  Pestalozzi  compared  (May,  1893);  Bowen’s  Froebel  and  education 
through  self-activity  (June,  1893);  Report  of  the  Committee  of  Ten  (January,  1894). 


